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These are my published answers to the seventeen questions posed by
Max Schlosshauer in his 2011 book Elegance and Enigma: the Quan-
tum Interviews . I have inserted thirty footnotes into those answers,
commenting on them from the perspective of subsequent insights I ac-
quired during six weeks in March and April of 2012 with Chris Fuchs
and Ruediger Schack at the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study.
Aside from the footnotes and a few introductory paragraphs, the text is
identical to my contributions to the Schlosshauer volume.
My title imitates that of arXiv:1207.2141, “Interview with a Quantum Bayesian”, by
Christopher A. Fuchs. Mine differs from his in several ways. I prefer Fuchs’s term “QBist”
because Fuchs’s view of quantum mechanics differs from others as radically as cubism
differs from renaissance painting, and because I find his term “quantum Bayesianism” too
broad. QBism explores the consequences for the interpretation of quantum mechanics of a
thorough-going subjective view of probability, as an agent’s measure of her own personal
degree of belief. But there are Bayesians who take probabilities to reflect objective facts
about an event rather than subjective judgments of an agent. I would prefer to name
Fuchs’s perspective not after Thomas Bayes, but after that eloquent pioneer of subjective
probability, Bruno de Finetti: Quantum Bruno-de-Finetti-ism. Still QBism, but with the
“B” for Bruno, not Bayes.
Another difference in our titles is that while Fuchs describes himself as a QBist, the
author of the text below was not yet there. Max Schlosshauer asked seventeen questions of
seventeen people and published the 289 answers, question by question, in his book Elegance
and Enigma: The Quantum Interviews , Springer, 2011. My answers to Schlosshauer’s
questions were finished in April 2011, a year before I spent six weeks in Stellenbosch at
STIAS with Fuchs and Ruediger Schack, and finally began to understand what they had
been trying to tell me for the past ten years. (I published a summary of my Stellenbosch
epiphany as a Commentary in the July 2012 Physics Today. That Commentary elicited
several letters to the editor, mostly critical, which were published in December 2012,
together with my further comments.)
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In July 2012, Fuchs posted his own answers to Schlosshauer’s seventeen questions at
arXiv and urged me to post mine. I hesitated. By posting nothing at arXiv since 2008,
I had ceased to qualify as an endorser, an appropriate loss of status for a retired country
gentleman that I was anxious not to reverse. Recently the authorities at arXiv removed
this concern by accepting my request to make my dequalification permanent. I was also
worried that many of the views I expressed in Schlosshauer’s book had changed since
Stellenbosch. But, rather to my surprise, I discovered that few of them had. Fortunately
Schlosshauer prohibited footnotes in his book, making it easy for me to maintain verbatim
my original 2011 text, while comparing it with my post-Stellenbosch views of early 2013.
My annotated replies to Schlosshauer’s questions are as follows:
The Seventeen Questions of Maximilian Schlosshauer
Q1. What first stimulated your interest in the foundations of quantum me-
chanics?
I’ve always been more fascinated by physics as a conceptual structure than by physics
as a set of rules for calculating the behavior of the natural world—what Suman Seth calls
the “physics of principles,” as opposed to the “physics of problems.” My text with Neil
Ashcroft on solid-state physics is a success because Neil is as focused on the physics of
problems as I am on the physics of principles. Somehow we managed to produce a book
that combines both views.
The conceptual structure of quantum mechanics is stranger and lovelier than any
perspective on the world that I know of, so I’ve been fascinated and worried about it from
the beginning of my career in physics. Indeed I became interested in my early teens in
the late 1940s long before I knew enough mathematics to learn the quantum formalism,
through the popular writings of George Gamow, Arthur Eddington, and James Jeans. In
college, I put these interests on hold, majoring in mathematics and taking only a few
courses in (classical) physics.
But I returned to physics in graduate school, where my revived curiosity about quan-
tum foundations was actively discouraged by my teachers. To my disappointment, the
Harvard physicists all believed that a preliminary training in the physics of problems was
a prerequisite to any understanding of the physics of principles. So, for a quarter of a
century, I was deflected full-time into statistical physics, low-temperature physics, and
solid-state physics, using (and teaching) quantum mechanics as a beautiful and effective
body of rules for manipulating symbols on a page to get answers to questions about ex-
periments in the laboratory. “Shut up and calculate!”
Early in graduate school, Gordon Baym, a fellow student, told me at the Hayes–
Bickford cafeteria about Bohm’s spin-1/2 version of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. EPR
was never mentioned in any official academic setting. I immediately concluded that the
quantum-mechanical description of physical reality was incomplete, and I made a note to
think about completing it when I got tired of the serious pursuits my teachers had set me
on. (After my oral qualifying exam, Roy Glauber advised me to stop spending so much
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time with Gordon Baym. The senior members of my committee, Wendell Furry and Julian
Schwinger, seemed to agree.)
More than two decades later, in 1979, fifteen years after John Bell’s now-famous paper
appeared, I learned about Bell’s theorem through the pages of the Scientific American.
I believe Tony Leggett had tried to tell me about it a few years earlier, but I was too
busy with real physics to pay attention. I realized to my astonishment that the more
complete theory that EPR had convinced me would someday be found to underly quantum
mechanics, resolving all its mysteries, either did not exist or, if it did, would be at least
as mysterious. In the three decades since then, I’ve devoted a significant fraction of my
intellectual efforts to pondering such puzzles, mainly trying to boil them down to their
simplest possible forms.
Q2. What are the most pressing problems in the foundations of quantum
mechanics today?
1. In the words of Chris Fuchs,1 “quantum states: what the hell are they?” Quantum
states are not objective properties of the systems they describe, as mass is an objective
property of a stone. Given a single stone, about which you know nothing, you can deter-
mine its mass to a high precision. Given a single photon, in a pure polarization state about
which you know nothing, you can learn very little about what that polarization was. (I
say “was,” and not “is,” because the effort to learn the polarization generally results in a
new state, but that is not the point here.)
But I also find it implausible that (pure) quantum states are nothing more than
provisional guesses for what is likely to happen when the system is appropriately probed.
Surely they are constrained by known features of the past history of the system to which
the state has been assigned, though I grant there is room for maneuver in deciding what
it means to “know” a “feature.”2
Consistent historians (see also my answer to Question 16) maintain that the quantum
state of a system is a real property of that system, though its reality is with respect to an
appropriate “framework” of projectors that includes the projector on that state. Since the
reality of most other physical properties is also only with respect to suitable frameworks,
for consistent historians the quantum state of a system is on a similar conceptual footing
to most of its other physical properties.3 Quantum cosmologists maintain that the entire
universe has an objective pure quantum state. I do not share this view. Indeed, I do not
believe it has a quantum state in any sense, since there is nothing (nobody) outside the
entire universe to make that state assignment.4 Well, I suppose it could be God, but why
would he want to make state assignments? Einstein has assured us that he doesn’t place
bets.5 (See also my answer to Question 4.)
1 I’m pleased to see that I cite the Master himself, in listing the most pressing of the
problems.
2 This is an anti-QBist sentiment with, however, a tip of the hat to QBism at the end
of the sentence.
3 From a Qbist perspective this is a deficiency.
4 This is a strictly QBist view, very concisely put.
5 A direct reference to the Dutch-book view of probability dear to QBists.
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2. How clearly and convincingly to exorcise nonlocality from the foundations of physics
in spite of the violations of Bell inequalities. Nonlocality has been egregiously oversold.6
On the other hand, those who briskly dismiss it as a naive error are evading a direct
confrontation with one of the central peculiarities of quantum physics. I would put the
issue like this: what can one legitimately require of an explanation of correlations between
the outcomes of independently selected tests performed on systems that no longer interact?
(See also my answer to Question 8.)
3. Is the experience of personal consciousness beyond the reach of physical theory as a
matter of principle? Is the scope of physics limited to constructing “relations between the
manifold aspects of our experience,” as Bohr maintained? While I believe that the answer
to both question is yes, I list them as problems, because most physicists vehemently reject
such views, and I am unable to explain to them why they are wrong in a way that satisfies
me, let alone them.7
I regard this last issue as a problem in the interpretation of quantum mechanics,
even though I do not believe that consciousness (as a physical phenomenon) collapses (as
a physical process) the wave packet (as an objective physical entity). But because I do
believe that physics is a tool to help us find powerful and concise expressions of correlations
among features of our experience, it makes no sense to apply quantum mechanics (or any
other form of physics) to our very awareness of that experience.8 Adherents of the many-
worlds interpretation make this mistake. So do those who believe that conscious awareness
can ultimately be reduced to physics, unless they believe that the reduction will be to a
novel form of physics that transcends our current understanding, in which case, as Rudolf
Peierls remarked, whether such an explanation should count as “physical” is just a matter
of terminology.
I am also intrigued by the view of Schro¨dinger (in Nature and the Greeks) that it was
a mistake dating back to the birth of science to exclude us, the perceiving subjects, from
our understanding of the external world. This does not mean that our perceptions must
be parts of the world external to us, but that that those perceptions underlie everything
we can know about that world. (See also my answer to Question 14.) Until the arrival of
quantum mechanics, physics made good sense in spite of this historic exclusion. Quantum
mechanics has (or should have) forced us to rethink the importance of the relation between
subject and object.9
Q3. What interpretive program can make the best sense of quantum mechan-
ics, and why?
6 Another position of QBists and many others.
7 I would call this QBism. My new QBist explanation of why most physicists are wrong
comes closer to satisfying me, but most of them are as dissatisfied as ever.
8 QBism. Today I would sharpen it to “It makes no sense for anybody to apply quantum
mechanics to his or her very own awareness of that experience.” You can apply it to what
you believe about the experience of somebody else.
9 I’m pleased and surprised to discover myself writing this very QBist paragraph back
in my dark pre-QBist days.
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My sympathies are with those, going all the way back to Heisenberg and Peierls, who
maintain that quantum mechanics is a set of rules for organizing our knowledge with a
view to improving our ability to anticipate subsequently acquired knowledge. By “our
knowledge,” I mean my own knowledge combined with whatever other people are able to
communicate to me of their own knowledge. I take this commonality of scientific knowledge
to be one of the reasons why Bohr placed such emphasis on what can be expressed in
ordinary language.10
To John Bell’s “Knowledge about what?” I would say knowledge about our percep-
tions—ultimately our direct, irreducible mental perceptions, which can, of course, be re-
fined by the use of instruments devised for that purpose. To his “Whose knowledge?”
I would say knowledge of whoever is making use of quantum mechanics. Different users
with different perceptions may well assign different quantum states to the same physical
system. What consistency requirements, if any, can be imposed on such descriptions, is
an entertaining question.11 I have had some disagreements with some of my friends about
this,12 as described in “Compatibility of state assignments,” which I cite here because it
cannot be found in the primary repository, arXiv, but only in the Journal of Mathematical
Physics (43, 4560-66 (2002)).
My answer to “Why?” has to be inferred from my answers to most of the other sixteen
questions.
Q4. What are quantum states?
The first of my answers to Question 2 primarily says what quantum states are not. It is
harder to say what they are. I am intrigued by the fact that if quantum mechanics applied
only to digital quantum computers, then the answer would be entirely straightforward.
Quantum states are mathematical symbols. The symbols enable us to calculate, from
the (explicit, unproblematic) prior history of a collection of Qbits—I commend to the
reader this attractive abbreviation of “qubit”—the probabilities of the readings (0 or 1)
of a collection of one-Qbit measurement gates to which the Qbits are then subjected.
This procedure is made unambiguous by the rule that a Qbit emerging from a one-Qbit
measurement gate reading 0 (or 1) is assigned the state |0〉 (or |1〉). This makes it possible
to assign initial states with the help of one-Qbit measurement gates. Additional rules
associate specific unitary transformations of the states of the Qbit(s) with the action of
the other subsequent gates that appear in a computation.
Quantum states, in other words, are bookkeeping tools that enable one to calculate,
from a knowledge of the initial preparation and the fields acting on a system, the proba-
10 Replace “knowledge” with “belief” and this becomes a very QBistic paragraph.
11 QBism again, if you replace “perceptions” by “experience” and “knowledge by” “be-
lief”.
12 Actually I elicited a ferocious QBist attack, which I flatter myself had an impact on
the subsequent development of QBism. See Caves, Fuchs, and Schack, “Conditions for
compatibility of quantum state assignments”, quant-ph/0206110, published as Phys. Rev.
A66, 062111 (2002). I hereby make a note to reexamine what, if anything, of my original
point survives my conversion.
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bility of the outcomes of measurements on that system.13 This is what I take to be the
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. (I hereby renounce my earlier summary
of Copenhagen, widely misattributed to Richard Feynman, as “shut up and calculate.”)
If the only application of quantum mechanics were to the operation of digital quantum
computers, there would be no ambiguity or controversy about Copenhagen.
The Copenhagen view fits quantum computation so well that I am persuaded that
quantum states are, even in broader physical contexts, calculational tools, invented and
used by physicists to enable them to predict correlations among their perceptions.14 I
realize that others have used their experience with quantum computation to make similar
arguments on behalf of many worlds (David Deutsch) and consistent histories (Bob Grif-
fiths). I would challenge them to make their preferred points of view the basis for a quick
practical pedagogical approach to quantum computation for computer scientists who know
no physics, as I have done with Copenhagen in my quantum-computation book. The ap-
proach to quantum mechanics via consistent histories in Griffiths’s book, while something
of a tour de force, does not strike me as either quick or practical.
Q5. Does quantum mechanics imply irreducible randomness in nature?
Yes. But “in nature” requires expansion. A more precise formulation would be that
quantum mechanics implies irreducible randomness in the answers to most of the questions
that we can put to nature. The probability of a photon that has emerged from a vertically
oriented sheet of polaroid getting through one oriented at forty-five degrees from the verti-
cal is irreducibly one half, as is the probability of a slow-moving mu meson turning into an
electron and a pair of neutrinos in the next microsecond-and-a-half. “Irreducible” means
there is nothing we can condition the probabilities on that would sharpen them up.15
Can you exploit quantum physics to make an ideal random-number generator?16 A
distinguished Cornell computer scientist once made the long trek from the Engineering
Quad to my physics-department office in the heart of the Arts College to ask me this
question. He had been told this by a student, and didn’t believe him. I said the student
was right. I don’t think he believed me either.
Q6. Quantum probabilities: subjective or objective?17
In a message in a bottle that I tossed into the sea about fifteen years ago—the “Ithaca
Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics” (IIQM)—I firmly declared quantum probabilities
to be objective properties of the physical world. The bottle was noticed by Chris Fuchs,
who introduced me to subjective probabilities and to his collaborators Carl Caves and
13 My QBist friends don’t like this. At a minimum they would replace “knowledge of”
with “belief about”.
14 My QBist friends would not object to this, particularly if “perceptions” was changed
to “experience”.
15 I seem here to be flirting with objective probabilities.
16 The QBist answer to this question is not obvious. It is not even clear what, if anything,
my question means to one who takes a subjective view of probability.
17 My answer is an interesting (to me) pre-Stellenbosch attempt to reconcile my IIQM
with Fuchs’s early QBism.
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Ru¨diger Schack. I found their point of view so intriguing that I have left the bottle adrift
ever since, but in thinking about it today, I wonder why I was so readily persuaded that
their view of probability was incompatible with mine.
In declaring quantum probabilities to be objective, I had in mind two things. First,
that the role of probability in quantum mechanics is fundamental and irreducible. Prob-
ability is not there just as a way of coping with our ignorance of the underlying details,
as in classical statistical mechanics. It is an inherent part of how we can understand and
deal with the world. Second, that probabilistic assertions are meaningful for individual
systems, and not just, as many physicists would maintain, for ensembles of “identically
prepared” systems. I believe Fuchs et al. would agree with both propositions.
I also explicitly rejected Karl Popper’s promotion of “propensities” into objective
properties of the systems they describe. It was not my intent to reify probability, or if it
was—fifteen years later it is hard to be sure—I hereby disassociate myself from the foolish
person I might then have been. Admittedly, my IIQM motto that “correlations have
physical reality” (though correlata do not) sounds dangerously like a Popperian reification
of probability. But it is not. In my two IIQM papers, I used the phrase “has physical
reality” to mean “can be accounted for in a physical theory,” particularly when I insisted
that conscious experience has reality, but not physical reality.
Thinking about this today, I see that to be compatible with the point of view of Fuchs
et al., I should also have maintained that correlations have physical reality but not reality.
“Physical reality” is not, as I seem to have implicitly maintained fifteen years ago, just
a subset of “reality.” Neither is contained in the other. Conscious awareness belongs to
reality and not to physical reality, but correlation belongs to physical reality and not to
reality. Putting it like that, I now see that this goes a way toward reconciling the IIQM
not only with Fuchs et al., but also with Adan Cabello’s demonstration that whatever the
sense in which correlations have physical reality, it cannot be that their values are EPR
“elements of reality.”
So I would say that quantum probabilities are objective in the sense that they are
unavoidable. They are intrinsic features of the quantum formalism—not just an expression
of our ignorance. And they apply to individual systems and are not just bookkeeping
devices for cataloguing the behavior of ensembles of identically prepared systems.
But because quantum mechanics is our best strategy for organizing our perceptions
of the world, quantum probabilities have a strategic aspect. Strategy implies a strategist,
and in that sense quantum probabilities are subjective.18
Strategic as the use of probability may be, the fact that a free neutron has a slightly
less than fifty-fifty chance of decaying within the next ten minutes strikes me as just as
objective a property of the neutron as the fact that its mass is a little less than 1,839 times
the mass of an electron. Of course, one can, and some of my friends do, conclude from this
that dynamics itself (in which mass is a parameter, and out of which emerges the half-life)
is as subjective a matter as probability. Wary as I am of reification, I’m not ready to take
that step.19
18 I would like to think this is a QBist sentiment.
19 A rare anti-QBist position.
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Q7. The quantum measurement problem: serious roadblock or dissolvable
pseudo-issue?
It’s a pseudoissue. But I have not dissolved it entirely to my satisfaction. So while
I see no roadblock, I do feel the need to drive slowly past some unfinished construction,
attending to signals from the people with flags.
Today “the quantum measurement problem” has almost as many meanings as “the
Copenhagen interpretation.” I mention only two of them. The first is how to account
for an objective physical process called the collapse of the wave function, which super-
sedes the normal unitary time evolution of the quantum state in special physical processes
known as measurements. I believe that this version of the problem is based on an inap-
propriate reification of the quantum state. So are efforts to eliminate the special role of
measurement through dynamical modifications in standard quantum mechanics that make
an appropriate rate of collapse an ongoing physical process under all conditions.
The quantum state is a calculational device, enabling us to compute the probabilities
of our subsequent experience on the basis of earlier experiences. Collapse is nothing more
than the updating of that calculational device on the basis of additional experience.20 This
point of view is the key to resolving this form of the quantum measurement problem. I
look forward to the day when some clear-headed gifted writer has spelled it out so lucidly
that everybody is completely convinced that there is no such problem. (I’m convinced.
But I’m not completely convinced.21)
A second question going under the name “quantum measurement problem” is whether
there can be quantum interference between quantum states that describe macroscopically
distinct physical conditions (sometimes called “cat states”). If such interference is not
just hard to observe but strictly absent, then quantum mechanics must break down in its
answers to questions of sufficient complexity, asked of systems of sufficient size. Size alone
is not the issue, since quantum mechanics works brilliantly in accounting for all kinds
of classically inexplicable behavior in the gross behavior of bulk materials. Indeed, the
appropriate definition of “macroscopic” in this setting is far from obvious.
The fact that the unavoidable entanglement of a macroscopic system with its envi-
ronment renders manifestations of quantum interference effectively unobservable is a good
practical rejoinder to those who seek an answer from a macroscopic breakdown of quantum
mechanics. But decoherence does not directly address the question of whether anything
actually changes when the superposition is replaced by a mixed state, beyond an abstract
representation of our practical ability to acquire knowledge. And it is subject to the same
kinds of time-reversal problems that plague statistical-mechanical derivations of the second
law.
Seeing quantum interference effects with carbon-60 molecules is an experimental tour
de force. But I would have been astonished if interference had been demonstrably absent.
My impression is that those who did the experiment did not expect it to reveal a breakdown
of quantum mechanics. They did it because it was there, like Mount Everest, challenging
somebody to take it on.
20 Quintessential QBism!
21 Now I am.
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Q8. What do the experimentally observed violations of Bell’s inequalities tell
us about nature?
They tell us something strange about correlations in the outcomes of certain sets
of local tests, independently chosen to be performed on far-apart noninteracting physical
systems, which may have interacted in the past but no longer do. Prior to Bell’s analysis of
such quantum-theoretic correlations (and the experimental confirmation of those theoretic
predictions), it seemed reasonable to assume that correlations in the outcomes of such tests
could find an explanation in correlations in the conditions prevailing at the sites of the
tests. Such local conditions can include individual features of the locally tested system,
acquired at the time of its past interaction with the other systems; the conditions can also
include the weather at the place of the test, the time of each local test, and so on.
Such local explanations can indeed be constructed for any single choice of which local
test to perform on each system. But if there is more than one choice of test for each
system, then there can be circumstances (revealed by a violation of an appropriate Bell
inequality) in which no single explanation, based on correlation in the locally prevailing
conditions, works for all possible choices of local test, even if the choices of local test are
made randomly and independently in each local region. This is strange, because the local
conditions prevailing at the site of any particular test cannot depend on a random choice
of what test to perform far away from that site.
Failure of a Bell inequality fatally undermines the view that all the correlations in
all the possible tests can find a single explanation in terms of correlations in conditions
at the sites of the tests. The conclusions people draw from this vary widely. Those who
conclude that the choice of what test to perform in one region does affect the prevailing
conditions in the other regions (as it does explicitly in the de Broglie–Bohm pilot-wave
interpretation) have embraced nonlocality.
A more conservative conclusion is that it is unreasonable to demand a single explana-
tion that works not only for the choices of test that were actually made in each region, but
also for the choices of test that might have been made but were not. This is the conclusion
of that subset of the quantum-information community with which I sympathize. It is also
the conclusion of consistent historians (see my answer to Question 16), but their appar-
ent conservatism hides their ontologically radical insistence that all the explanations give
correct accounts of the tests to which they apply, subject to the proviso that you cannot
combine ingredients of one explanation with those of any other, since their validity is in
general relative to different “frameworks.”
I like Asher Peres’s conclusion that unperformed tests have no outcomes: it is wrong
to try to account for the outcomes of all the tests you might have performed but didn’t.
This too is more radical than it appears, since recent versions of Bell’s theorem (inspired
by Danny Greenberger, Mike Horne, and Anton Zeilinger) show that the outcome of the
test you actually performed is incompatible with each and every possible set of outcomes
for all the tests you might have performed but didn’t. This adds a word to Asher’s famous
title: “Unperformed experiments have no conceivable results.”
That addition makes his point just a little harder to swallow. But swallowing becomes
easier again if I expand Asher’s title further to “Many different sets of unperformed ex-
periments have no conceivable sets of results, if the result for each local test has to be
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exactly the same in every set of results in which that particular local test appears.” (The
expanded title itself, however, is harder to swallow.) What can it mean to impose such
consistency on sets of conceivable data associated with different choices of sets of local
tests, when only one set of tests was actually performed?
So for me, nonlocality is too unsubtle a conclusion to draw from the violation of Bell
inequalities. My preference is for conclusions that focus on the impropriety of seeking
explanations for what might have happened but didn’t. Evolution has hard-wired us to
demand such explanations, since it was crucial for our ancestors to anticipate the conse-
quences of all possible contingencies in their (classical) struggles.
(See also the second of my answers to Question 2.)
Q9. What contributions to the foundations of quantum mechanics have or may
come from quantum-information theory? What notion of ‘information’ could
serve as a rigorous basis for progress in foundations?
I agree with Heisenberg and Peierls that the quantum formalism is a tool we have
discovered to express the information we have acquired and the consequences of that
information for the content of our subsequent acquisition of information. To the extent
that it sharpens and systematizes this point of view, I believe that quantum information
theory is the most promising and fruitful foundational approach.22
Beyond this, applying the quantum formalism directly to the processing of information
itself may get us closer to the heart of what quantum mechanics is all about, than can the
informationally less subtle problems addressed in more traditional physical applications of
quantum mechanics. At the very least, it provides a refreshingly different set of examples
of quantum phenomena.
I am not expert enough in quantum (or classical) information theory to have an
opinion on the definition of information most likely to shed light on foundational questions.
Slogans like “It from bit” are fun, but don’t tell me much without considerable (yet to
be provided) expansion. It seems to me that any foundationally illuminating concept of
information must be explicit about both the possessors of the information and the content
of that information.23 As John Bell put it, “Whose information?” and “Information about
what?”
(See also my answer to Question 16.)
Q10. How can the foundations of quantum mechanics benefit from approaches
that reconstruct quantum mechanics from fundamental principles? Can recon-
struction reduce the need for interpretation?
It is wonderful that all of special relativity follows from the principle that no physical
behavior can distinguish among frames of reference in different states of uniform motion,
combined with the realization that the simultaneity of events in different places is a con-
vention that can differ from one frame of reference to another. Can the rest of physics—in
particular quantum mechanics—be reduced to so economical a set of assumptions?
22 Replace “information” by “belief” and this is QBism.
23 QBism is explicit: The possessor of the belief is the agent using quantum mechanics
to assign probabilities; the content of the belief comes from the experience of the agent.
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I doubt it. Even the foundations of special relativity are not captured as compactly
as I just claimed. I failed, for example, to mention the assumptions of spatial and tem-
poral homogeneity, and of spatial isotropy. And the fundamental notion of an “event”—a
phenomenon whose spatial and temporal extent we can ignore for purposes of the topic
currently under discussion—might strike some as irritatingly vague, bringing “us” into the
story in a way physics traditionally (and, I increasingly believe, wrongly24) tries to avoid.
And just what are these human artifacts called “clocks” that play so fundamental a role
in the story? In short, it’s not as simple as advertised.
Yet quantum mechanics does seem to be floating in the air, in a way that makes
relativity seem quite anchored. At least the basic conceptual ingredients of relativity have
at first glance a direct intuitive correspondence with familiar phenomena in our imme-
diate experience. The complicating issues for relativity emerge only when one insists on
sharpening up these intuitions. In contrast, the basic ingredients of quantum mechanics—
states, superpositions, and their linear evolution in time—bear not even a vague relation
to anything in our direct experience, while measurement—the only thing that ties the
subject to the ground—seems to introduce what John Bell derided as “piddling laboratory
operations” at too fundamental a level.
I’m glad people are attempting to reconstruct quantum mechanics from (a few) fun-
damental principles, but I’m skeptical that they’ll succeed without slipping into at least
one of their principles something just as much in need of interpretation. The reason I’m
nevertheless glad is that having a new and strikingly different formulation of the really
puzzling stuff can sometimes be a useful step toward untangling the puzzle
Q11. If you could choose one experiment, regardless of its current technical
feasibility, to help answer a foundational question, which one would it be?
The foundational issues about quantum mechanics that perplex me are all predicated
on the assumption that the theory is correct. I would like to be able to make better sense
of what it says. I am not persuaded that my perplexity is so acute that I should seek the
answer in a breakdown of the theory. Therefore I would not expect any experimental test
to shed light on a foundational question.
I exclude here the possibility that a crucial foundational issue might be associated
with an application of the theory so intricate that the relevant calculation might be too
difficult to perform, thereby requiring an experimental test. It does seem to me that all
the puzzling features of the theory emerge full-blown in its most calculationally elementary
applications.
This is not to say that the breakdowns of quantum mechanics suggested by some
interpretations are not worth exploring through experiment. (See also my answer to Ques-
tion 7.) I expect quantum mechanics to break down at some scale. Indeed, I find it
amazing, in view of the body of data that gave rise to it, that it seems to be working per-
fectly well within the atomic nucleus and even within the nucleon. This lends support to
viewing quantum mechanics as a “mode of thought,” as Chris Fuchs and Ru¨diger Schack
once put it, rather than as a description of the world.25
24 Definitely a QBist sentiment.
25 A tip of the hat to the two leading QBists .
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So I would be surprised (and rather disappointed) if foundational issues were settled
by observing a breakdown of quantum mechanics. I would expect them to be settled by
our acquiring a deeper understanding of the existing theory, within its domain of validity.
Q12. If you have a preferred interpretation of quantum mechanics, what would
it take to make you switch sides?
My intuitions about the nature of quantum mechanics are not coherent enough to add
up to anything I would dignify with the term “interpretation.” Admittedly, shortly after
turning sixty, I did write a few papers setting out what I called the Ithaca Interpretation
(see also my answer to Question 6). But I was young then, innocent, and overly willing to
sacrifice an accurate phrase for an entertaining one.
One of those papers made its argument under the banner of Bohr’s statement that
the purpose of our description of nature is “only to track down, so far as it is possible,
relations between the manifold aspects of our experience.” When I wrote the paper, the
crucial word for me was relations . My motto was correlations without correlata. What
led me to stop giving physics colloquia on the IIQM after only a year was the obvious
question: “Correlations between what?” Abner Shimony aptly complained that the Ithaca
Interpretation “had no foreign policy.” Exchanges with Chris Fuchs persuaded me that
just as important as relations was our experience, which I was too ready to hide beneath
the same rug under which I had (correctly) swept the problem of consciousness.
So insofar as I had a preferred interpretation in 1998, what persuaded me that it was,
at best, insufficiently developed was somebody making me aware of some interesting ideas
that hadn’t occurred to me. It remains entirely possible that some wise, imaginative, and
readable person may in the future lure me away from the position I am trying to sketch
in my answers to these questions.26
To make me switch to some interpretations I now reject would require a breakdown
of quantum mechanics along lines suggested by these currently unpalatable points of view.
Of course, at that point they would no longer be interpretations of existing theory, but
alternative theories. To convert me to Bohmian mechanics, for example, I would have
to see clear evidence of particles that were not in “quantum equilibrium.” Without that
breakdown of orthodox quantum mechanics, the reintroduction of particle trajectories
seems an unnecessary complication that raises questions at least as vexing as those raised
by the orthodox theory. To convert me to the view that “wave-function collapse” was a real
physical process and not just an updating of expectations on the basis of new information,
I would have to see convincing evidence of deviations from quantum probabilities produced
by Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber–Pearle “hits.”
A simple nontrivial example of a history containing many different times that exactly
satisfied the consistency conditions might persuade me to take another look at consistent
histories (see my answer to Question 16).
26 That position is so close to QBism that I’m not sure that in Stellenbosch my QBist
friends lured me very far.
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Q13. How do personal beliefs and values influence one’s choice of interpreta-
tion?
The belief that physics is, or ought to be, the whole story surely plays a role. Those
who believe that physics describes the external world as it relates to us have an interpretive
flexibility unavailable to those who insist that “we” have no place in the story except as
complex physical systems.27 (See also the third of my answers to Question 2.)
I have the impression that those physicists who believe in God tend, perhaps un-
surprisingly, to take a more strongly realistic view of the abstractions that make up the
quantum formalism than do many of us who take an atheistic view of the world.
There are also those who maintain that while God does not exist, Physical Law does.
Since I agree with the first half of this proposition, I would not call them idolatrous. But
others might.
Values (as opposed to beliefs) are harder to identify. I sometimes detect them in
the attitudes of those who believe in, or search for, hidden-variables models of quantum
mechanics. I have heard ringing declarations about the nature of science, exhortations not
to give up the good fight, and expressions of scorn for contemporary obscurity. (See also
my answer to Question 15.)
Q14. What is the role of philosophy in advancing our understanding of the
foundations of quantum mechanics?
If quantum mechanics is correct, or even if it is only correct to a high degree of accuracy
in some yet-to-be-delimited domain, then everything in quantum foundations counts as
philosophy. Let me rephrase the question: what role have professional philosophers played
in advancing our understanding of the foundations of quantum mechanics? I do not count
as “philosophers” professional philosophers who are also professional physicists, and I count
as “professional” anybody with a Ph.D. in the field.
When I got into this business thirty years ago, I had hoped that philosophers would
bring to the conversation their historical expertise in the Big Questions. What is the
nature of human knowledge? How do people construct a model of the world external to
themselves? How does our mental organization limit our ability to picture phenomena?
How does our need to communicate with each other constrain the kinds of science we can
develop? Those kinds of questions.
To my disappointment, it seems to me that professional philosophers prefer to behave
as amateur physicists. They don’t try to view the formalism as part of a Bigger Picture.
On the contrary, they seem to prefer to interpret it more literally and less imaginatively
than many professional physicists. Because they are less proficient than physicists in using
the tools of physics, they tend not to do as good a job on these narrower matters. They
often come through as naive and unsophisticated.
So I would say that up to now, professional philosophers have not played a significant
role in advancing our understanding of quantum foundations. I would not (and could not)
discourage them from working in quantum foundations. But I would urge them to keep
their eyes on the Big Questions. (See also my answer to Question 15.)
27 QBists!
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Q15. What new input and perspectives for the foundations of quantum me-
chanics may come from the interplay between quantum theory and grav-
ity/relativity, and from the search for a unified theory?
My guess is that an understanding of the connection between gravity and quantum
mechanics will have to await new input and perspectives from the foundations of both
disciplines. Space and time in quantum field theory are classical parameters. They’re
on our side of the subject–object boundary.28 Extrapolating them down to sub-nucleon
levels—let alone to the Planck scale—strikes me as unwarranted and even arrogant. (I note
with interest a hint of some personal values here. Compare my answer to Question 13.)
Spatial and temporal coordinates describe the readings of our instruments.
I’m just as skeptical about quantum cosmologists applying quantum mechanics to the
universe as a whole. For quantum mechanics to make sense, there has to be an inside (“the
system”) and an outside (“us”).29
So insofar as gravity is a theory of the structure of space-time, I’d be surprised if real
progress were made in incorporating it into quantum theory without a more thoughtful
and (dare I say it?) philosophical examination of the foundations of both fields.
Q16. Where would you put your money when it comes to predicting the next
major development in the foundations of quantum mechanics?
Let me put the question in a more manageable form: what was the last major develop-
ment in the foundations of quantum mechanics? (It remains basically the same question,
since none of the developments that follow have been broadly accepted as the most illu-
minating way to look at the subject.)
I would nominate for the most important recent development the application of quan-
tum mechanics to the processing of information, starting with the invention of quantum
cryptography by Bennett and Brassard in 1984, continuing with the development of quan-
tum computation, and the fascinating efforts of Chris Fuchs to make a coherent whole
out of it all.30 As runner-up, I would cite the study of pre- and postselected ensembles
by Aharanov and his collaborators, and (perhaps—I still lack a good feeling for it) the
ensuing notion of weak measurement. In third place, I would put the consistent-histories
point of view, as put forth by Bob Griffiths.
What all three of these developments have in common is that they are standard
quantum mechanics applied in highly nonstandard settings. In this respect, they are all
conservative approaches to quantum foundations. They use the orthodox theory to answer
simple questions that it had never before occurred to anybody to ask. The answers provide
intriguing new perspectives on the theory.
28 The distinction between subject (agent) and object (world external to the agent) is
a fundamental part of QBism. Schro¨dinger also makes much of it, particularly (but not
exclusively) in Nature and the Greeks. See also my Commentary in the July 2012 Physics
Today and my remarks in the December 2012 issue about the letters it elicited.
29 More QBism.
30 QBism is at the top of the list.
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Because the last of the three seems to have been widely ignored in the quantum-
foundations community and is unrepresented among the authors of this volume, I’ll say a
little about it. (My old friend Pierre Hohenberg has tried valiantly to get me to take this
stuff seriously.31 Pierre and I were in both college and graduate school together, but in all
those years nobody ever warned me to stay away from him; see my answer to Question 1.
Maybe somebody should have.)
Consistent historians offer an unusual fusion of collapse and no-collapse points of view.
Underlying their weltanschauung is an old formula of Aharanov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz
(ABL), which compactly gives the probabilities of the outcomes of a whole sequence of (von
Neumann) measurements carried out at different times on a system in a given initial state.32
Prior to its reinterpretation33 by consistent historians, the ABL formula was understood to
be an expression of the fact that immediately after any particular measurement, the state
of the system collapses according to the standard Born rule; this postcollapse state then
evolves under the unitary dynamics until the next measurement in the sequence produces
another collapse. Unitary evolution, followed by measurement and collapse, followed by
more unitary evolution, followed by more measurement and collapse, and so on.
Consistent historians eliminate measurement and collapse from the story by reinter-
preting these probabilities to be probabilities of what I would call actual states of be-
ing—called histories. These histories (or, more accurately, the subset of them deemed
“consistent,” as noted below) have nothing to do with measurement outcomes. For con-
sistent historians the ABL formula is thus more fundamental and broader in scope than
the Born rule. The Born rule can be extracted from the consistent historians’ version of
ABL in some very special cases, but measurement vanishes from ABL in the general case,
which according to consistent historians gives probabilities not of measurement outcomes
but of actual states of being.
How can they get away with this vast extension of actuality to entities whose nonex-
istence lies at the very heart of conventional quantum mechanics? Easily! They do it by
forbidding the extension whenever it gets you into trouble; they impose stringent consis-
tency conditions on the probabilities appearing in any candidate for a valid history. Any
history that meets these consistency conditions can describe the probabilities of an actual
state of being, and not the mere outcomes of a set of piddling laboratory operations. Any
history that violates the consistency conditions is utter nonsense—not a history at all, and
certainly not a description of actual states of being.
As one might expect, there can be many distinct histories, all of which meet their
own internal consistency conditions, although the state of being that combines the actual
states of being associated with more than one of those histories need not satisfy its own
internal consistency conditions. When this happens, the combination of the two actual
states of being is not an actual state of being.
31 He disapproves of my recent interest in QBism.
32 Bob Griffiths tells me that the formula was published by Wigner a year before ABL.
33 Griffiths also made me realize that I should have said “drastic reinterpretation”. I
believe that I did in an earlier draft, since I was surprised to discover, when he complained,
that “drastic” was not in the book.
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Rather than concluding from this that the project is dead in the water, the consistent
historians elevate it to a fundamental ontological principle. Reality is multifaceted. There
can be this reality or there can be that reality, and provided you refrain from combining
actualities from mutually inconsistent realities, all of the incompatible realities have an
equally valid claim to actuality. This tangle of mutually incompatible candidates for actu-
ality (associated with different “frameworks”) constitutes the no-collapse side of consistent
histories. The collapse side lies in the fact that each of these peacefully coexisting mutu-
ally exclusive actualities is associated with what from the orthodox point of view (which
consistent historians reject) would be a sequence of measurements and Born-rule collapses.
This multiplicity of incompatible realities reminds me of special relativity, where there
is time in this frame of reference and time in that frame of reference, and provided only
that you do not combine temporal statements valid in two different frames of reference,
one set of temporal statements is as valid a description of reality as the other.
But I am disconcerted by the reluctance of some consistent historians to acknowledge
the utterly radical nature of what they are proposing. The relativity of time was a pretty
big pill to swallow, but the relativity of reality itself is to the relativity of time as an
elephant is to a gnat. (Murray Gell Mann, in his talk of “demon worlds,” comes close to
acknowledging this, yet he dismisses much less extravagant examples of quantum mysteries
as so much “flapdoodle.”)
Q17. What single question about the foundations of quantum mechanics would
you put to an omniscient being?
I’d ask, “How has the uncertainty principle altered the ‘omni’ of your omniscience?”
Joking aside—but it wasn’t really a joke—I have trouble imagining an omniscient
being. Let me rephrase the question: if you could be frozen for 150 years and revived
intact, what question would you ask physicists when you woke up?
I’d ask something like this:
Is the fundamental physics of a system still described in terms of quantum states that
evolve linearly in time and that specify probabilities of the outcomes of tests that we can
perform on that system? If so, is anybody puzzled by the meaning of this conceptual
structure? If not, is there general agreement on the meaning of the structure that replaced
it?
In early twenty-first-century terms: has the structure of quantum mechanics survived
intact for a century and a half? If so, are there still foundational problems? If not, are
there still foundational problems?
I chose 150 years because a century might not be long enough to get an interesting
answer. But I also worry that physicists two centuries from now, no matter how I phrased
the question, might not understand it. It might elicit only polite bewilderment, just as a
pressing aether-theoretic query at the end of the nineteenth century might seem not only
irrelevant but downright incomprehensible to a physicist of the early twenty-first.
There are two possible grounds for future bewilderment at my question. One is that
quantum mechanics will have been discovered, as Einstein always hoped, to be a phe-
nomenology based on a more fundamental view of the world, which is more detailed and
more intuitively accessible. This strikes me as unlikely, because John Bell showed that
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any theory detailed enough to satisfy certain common-sense yearnings would also have to
contain instantaneous action-at-a-distance. (See my answer to Question 8.) So while the
discovery of a more fundamental view of the world during the next century and a half
seems entirely possible, I’d be surprised if the new theory turned out to be more intuitive
than our current understanding.
An appropriate timescale for the survival of quantum mechanics is set by the fact
that its basic conceptual machinery has suffered no alterations whatever, beyond a little
tidying-up, for over eighty years. Not a bad run when you compare what happened to
fundamental knowledge between 1860 and 1940, though not close to the more than two
centuries that classical mechanics remained the fundamental theory. So the persistence of
the same basic formalism for another 150 years seems at least plausible.
Even so, my question might elicit mid-twenty-second-century bewilderment, because
after several more generations of physicists, chemists, biologists, engineers, and computer
scientists had worked with the theory, it might finally, in Feynman’s words, have become
obvious to everybody that there’s no real problem. We early twenty-first-century people,
who believed there ought to be a better way to understand the theory, will then have been
consigned to the same dustbin of history as the early twentieth-century aether theorists.
I hope that’s not how it works out. It is, for example, now possible to articulate
the nature of the wrong thinking that made relativity seem shockingly counterintuitive to
many people during its early years. People had simply deluded themselves into believing
that there was something called “time” that clocks recorded, rather than recognizing that
“time” was a remarkably convenient abstraction—I would say an ingenious abstraction,
except that nobody set out deliberately to invent it—that enables us to talk efficiently and
even-handedly about the correlation among many different kinds of clocks.
There is now no generally agreed-upon key to dissolving the puzzlement that quantum
mechanics engenders today in many of us. (For that matter, I have encountered otherwise
sensible physicists who disagree with the above resolution of the puzzles of relativity.)
I would hope that within the next 150 years, such a key might be found that almost
everybody would agree clarifies the character of the theory, in contrast to today’s state of
affairs, where no school of thought commands more than ten percent of the population,
except for those who maintain—but can they really mean it?—that there is nothing to be
puzzled about.
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